Disinformation 101: How do you find it?

"I am interested in the HOW of your methodology, and my readers would be, too. In layman's terms. What do you look for? Are there other issues ..." - Christine

Christine Axsmith found me and asked me a question. I promised an answer, which is what this is. It isn’t the complete answer. That is a longer discussion and we’ll get to it all at some point, if you want. But for now, we’ll take a very small step into the world of cognitive warfare, i.e., the Matrix.

WARNING: This topic will disturb some of you and your quest will end. For others, it is the first step into true cognitive warfare. For the good of society, as you will read below, I hope ALL of you end your quest today.

So why me? Why did Christine find me? You don’t need to know me. Who I am. What I’ve done. That will bias you on some level, so for now just know that I am the founder and creator of the Veriphix Belief3 NatSec platform. I am a Physicist and most of what you read will be grounded in Quantum theory and managing uncertainty. It is all science based. For social engineering to reliably work it must be science based.

Social engineering has changed. Back in the 90’s, I helped created a customer motivation technology (“If user’s like X, they may like Y.”) You’ve likely used it. 25 years later as the world has changed social engineering has also changed. So now, I run a social engineering company called Veriphix. It is a new type of technology that effectively hacks into the communal (intersubjective) beliefs of populations and enables them to be changed. We can see others doing it, or do it ourselves. We first demonstrated the capability publicly in 2018 during the U.S. Missouri Senate race. It placed 1st in a NATO competition. The Russian's have singled us out. It the most advanced social engineering technology on the planet and it is in use. What a Cambridge Analytica took 12+ months to do with unethical data sources, we do it in a day using ethically sourced micro data that adversaries cannot detect or intercept.

Christine found me and asked a question about “disinformation.”

“I am interested in the HOW of your methodology, and my readers would be, too. In layman's terms. What do you look for? Are there other issues where this kind of thing is done, like conspiracy theories?”

Answer:

Social engineering has plumbing (how we deliver a change inducing message) and content (what change the person). “Disinformation” incudes BOTH plumbing and content. How you find it changes depending on how “disinformation” is being used.

Let’s first focus “disinformation” as content

If “disinformation” is the content, namely the mere discussion of “disinformation” is what is being used to induce a change, it presupposes a concept that Christine did not ask: Should we even be discussing “disinformation”?

Social engineering requires that you adopt the view that humans have no free will. You need to know humans are not in control and can be heavily influenced, if not controlled. Most of you have heard of Robert M. Sapolsky's work on free will and his book Determined.

What many ignore is the import of Sapolsky’s discussion concerning how believing that free will is an illusion results in those people being:

• less creative;

• less willing to learn from their mistakes;

• less grateful towards others; and

• more hostile.

Believing there is no free will destroys societies. Societies literally exist based on the illusion of free will (an intersubjective belief).

When “disinformation” is used as content, its purpose is to destroy the illusion of free will. That content (“disinformation'“) induces a scientifically based result. You are getting shot with bullets while looking for the adversary.

So how to find “disinformation”? Just look for anyone talking about “disinformation”, which is probably you. I know that is anticlimactic as hell, but if you recognize that populations can be socially engineered, you need to be very careful how you examine the space.

This is not theoretical harm, you need to accept that you are placing your mental health at risk by continuing down this path. That is science. It will happen. So stop now if you are in anyway uncomfortable. You are not a coward. The safest path forward is to NEVER discuss “disinformation”, believe in your God of choice, and go about your life. You are not retreating, you are literally saving society. Be a hero.

For those willing: We have other problems

When “disinformation” is plumbing, the actual thing doing the harm is the content. The content is the bullet.

Once a person has been socially engineered, that is their reality. To undo that reality, they would have to force themselves to believe they have no free will, which would then pull them out of society. Their brain will NOT undo the impact of that shift.

We need to think about the entire system and where it may have weaknesses because hunting for attacks is pointless.

If we step back and Fermi the problem, let’s pretend we are going to socially engineer an election in a hostile country. What do we need?

• Assuming we do nothing, what will the population do?

• What do we need to change in the population to induce the physical (kinetic) objective?

• What is the smallest portion of the population we can change and achieve the objective?

• What content will induce the change?

• How should the content get distributed?

We can probably add more, but that is close enough.

It shouldn’t be surprising that the Russian system is set up along those lines.

The first project described in the Kommersant article, called "Dispute" would “monitor the blogosphere, undertaking ‘research into processes of the shaping of internet social groups that spread information on social media platforms’ and ‘delineation of factors that influence the popularity and spread of information".

That information would be analysed by another system called "Monitor-3" whose purpose was “the development of methods of organisation and control of virtual internet societies of designated experts”.

A third system, called "Sturm-12", was designed to be a complex “for the automated dissemination” of information and the development of “mechanisms to initiate scripted scenarios for mass audiences on social media platforms”.

That early system has remained largely unchanged according to the recent leak on the system.

With that system in mind, we have several options:

• Find and disable the network prior to an attack;

• Find the network during pre-attack issue testing; or

• Rate limit potential attack issues prior to relevant events.

Finding the issue is the problem of narrative selection. If you have the issue, finding adversary attacks is a simple Boolean search. Twitter’s basic search function, or any platform for that matter, is all you need.

Guess at an issue and fail to have tight signature requirement and you can end up calling people Russian who are not. That is Matt Taibbi ‘s Twitter Files.

There is nice example of an attack in our 2018 test. The content was “Korea” and the amplification right before the election drove McCaskill’s numbers down

A key signature of an attack is that there will be an artificial amplification of an issue.

But it CANNOT trend! Trending is bad. That exposes our network. In an attack, we need to insert and then amplify to the target audience. We want to avoid having to rebuild the network after every attack.

If you know the issue and likely target, you can focus accordingly and look for abnormal usage. Abnormal usage would include:

• Higher than normal daily usage;

• Coordinated usage across multiple accounts, e.g., repeated content; and

• Repetitive usage across a single account.

So there will be signatures that you can look for to find likely pre-attack testing or intercept attacks in progress. The problem is the quantity of data. Without limiting the issues being monitored and likely audience, you will only find attacks after they have done their damage.

That is anticlimactic as hell. Again! That is why you should stop your quest.

But if you want to dive in deeper, we can. More to come.

Cheers,

-J